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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 1999 through
September 30, 2000. The cases examined include decisions of
courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
II. CONVEYANCING AND TITLE ISSUES
JVA Operating Co. v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.2 construes the reservation
of a production payment in a conveyance of leasehold interests. In
March 1969, the predecessors in interest to Kaiser-Francis Oil Company
("Kaiser-Francis") unitized their leasehold interests in ten tracts of land
with four other tracts for the production of oil and gas limited to the
Canyon Sands formation.3 In May 1969, Kaiser-Francis executed a con-
veyance to the predecessors in interest to JVA Operating Company, Inc.
("JVA") , and other leasehold interest owners conveying its leasehold in-
terests in the ten tracts, but reserving a production payment of
$3,900,000.00. 4 In 1992, JVA drilled a well and obtained production from
the Ellenberger formation, which was below the depth of the Canyon
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C. Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included.
2. 11 S.W. 3d 504 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, pet. denied)




Sands formation. 5 The issue was whether the production payment was
payable out of production from the Ellenberger or whether it was paya-
ble only on unitized production from the Canyon Sands.
The granting clause conveyed "The leasehold estates, described in Ex-
hibit 'A' which is attached hereto and made a part hereof (hereinafter
called 'Subject Interests')."' 6 Exhibit "A" made it clear that the "Subject
Interests" were the assignor's interests in oil, gas and mineral leases relat-
ing to the ten tracts of land.7 Thus, the granting clause conveyed all pro-
duction at all depths.
The reservation clause immediately following the granting clause read
as follows:
EXPRESSLY EXCEPTING AND EXCLUDING, HOWEVER,
from this assignment and retaining and reserving unto Assignors
[Kaiser-Francis], in proportion to their respective ownership, for
themselves and for their several and respective heirs, personal repre-
sentatives, successors and assigns, as a production payment, the here-
inafter shown percentages of Net Barrels of Oil and Gas produced,
saved, sold and allocated to the Subject Interests, hereinafter referred
to as "Reserved Percentage of the Hydrocarbons," from and after the
Effective Date and throughout the period hereinafter specified. 8
"Reserved Percentage of the Hydrocarbons" was defined in excruciat-
ing detail, and the controlling language for the term "Net Barrels of Oil
and Gas" was defined as follows:
(iv) The term "Net Barrels of Oil" as used herein, shall mean the
quantity of oil produced, saved and allocated as provided in the Unit
Agreement (as hereinafter described) .... The term "Net Cubic Feet
of Gas," as used herein, shall mean the quantity of gas produced,
saved, sold and allocated as provided in the Unit Agreement .... 9
Applying the "four corners" canon of construction, the court of appeals
determined that the production payment was to be paid from hydrocar-
bons produced only from the Canyon Sands formation. The court of ap-
peals noted that there was no reason for the drafter of the conveyance to
refer to oil or gas "produced, saved and allocated as provided in the Unit
Agreement" unless the drafter intended to limit production to the unit-
ized Canyon Sands formation in the Unit Agreement. 10 To adopt Kaiser-
Francis' position would have required the court to ignore that "Net Bar-
rels of Oil" was a defined term in the conveyance." Because the convey-
ance expressly provided that the terms "Net Barrels of Oil" and "Net
Cubic Feet of Gas" meant the quantity of oil and gas "produced, sold and
allocated as provided in the Unit Agreement," the court of appeals held
that the production payment was limited to oil and gas produced as pro-
5. Id. at 506.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. JVA, 11 S.W.3d at 506 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 508 (second emphasis added).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 507.
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vided in the Unit Agreement, which concerned production only from the
Canyon Sands formation.12
The conveyance was obviously drafted by parties familiar with oil and
gas transactions, and in many ways it is a precise instrument. Neverthe-
less, in stacking terms and definitions, the parties overlooked a funda-
mental issue the conveyance should have addressed in very simple terms.
The conveyance could easily have recited that the reserved production
payment "was payable from production from the Canyon Sands forma-
tion only," or that the reserved production payment "was payable from
all production at all depths from the Subject Interests." Defined terms
(e.g. "Net Barrels of Oil") are sometimes dangerous because they can be
tedious to analyze and may have unintended consequences. The risk is
heightened if the fundamental terms of the instrument are not plainly and
simply set forth.
Kilgore v. Black Stone Oil Co.13 considers the application of the doc-
trine of stare decisis to a boundary dispute. In Kilgore, the plaintiffs as-
serted that they owned mineral interests in the Escobeda League in Polk
County and sued the defendants for conversion of gas that the plaintiffs
argued belonged to them.14 Plaintiffs based their claim on an alleged
conflict between the Escobeda League and three other surveys.15 De-
fendants argued that the appellate court case of W. T. Carter & Bro. v.
Collins16 had determined in 1916 that there was no conflict between the
surveys, and although the parties in Kilgore did not claim under the par-
ties in Collins, they were bound under the doctrine of stare decisis.17 The
Beaumont Court of Appeals noted that there are two divergent concepts
regarding the application of stare decisis to boundary lines-the orthodox
and unorthodox doctrines. 18 The orthodox doctrine provides that stare
decisis applies only to questions of law. 19 Once the Texas Supreme Court
squarely decides a legal question, the decision is precedent, binding the
Supreme Court and all other lower courts when the identical question is
raised in a later suit between different parties.20 Some courts of appeals
have adopted the unorthodox doctrine of stare decisis and concluded that
a fact issue determination-such as the fixing of boundary lines, head-
right surveys, or other fixed real property markers-may be binding pre-
cedent under the doctrine of stare decisis.2l Under the unorthodox
doctrine, a prior ruling regarding the location of a boundary line will con-
trol the location of the same line in a second case, even though the first
12. Id. at 508.
13. 15 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. filed).
14. Id. at 668.
15. Id.
16. 192 S.W. 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1916, writ ref'd).
17. Kilgore, 15 S.W.3d at 667.






case turned upon an issue of fact or the legal questions raised in the first
case are not those of the second case.
The Beaumont Court of Appeals in Kilgore applied the unorthodox
doctrine and resolved all issues of conflicts between the Escobeda League
and the other surveys because the Collins court had ruled that there was
no conflict between the Escobeda League and the other surveys.22 The
court in Kilgore was also persuaded by the longstanding rule that real
property issues should remain settled once an appellate court has ruled.2 3
McCall v. McCall 4 considers whether the words "and appurtenances
thereto" contained in the granting clause of a mineral deed conveying a
specifically described tract also convey royalty interests in separate tracts
not specifically described in the deed.
Prior to 1975, a 3300 acre tract (both surface and minerals) was owned
jointly by three parties: the Taubs, the Dwyers, and Mildred McCall
("Mildred"). The land was subject to three oil and gas leases and was
included in a large producing unit known as the Bammel Field Unit. In
1975, the 3300 acre tract was partitioned into sixteen separate tracts (the
"1975 Partition").2 5 Under the 1975 Partition, Mildred received five
tracts ("McCall Tracts") which were burdened by a 20% royalty interest
in favor of the Taubs and Dwyers.26 Likewise, the 1975 Partition awarded
Mildred a 10% royalty interest in the tracts awarded to the Taubs and
Dwyers ("Taub/Dwyer Tracts"). Each party thus continued to own its
royalties and other benefits in each of the tracts granted to the other
parties.
Soon after the 1975 Partition, Mildred conveyed the McCall Tracts by
several deeds, which each stated:
[Mildred] does GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONVEY that
certain tract of land containing [acreage] in Harris County, Texas, as
more particularly described in Exhibit A ... together with all im-
provements thereon . . . and appurtenances thereto . . . unto
Grantees .... 27
None of the deeds referenced Mildred McCall's 10% royalty interest in
the Taub/Dwyer Tracts. 28 Based on the McCall deeds, Lila McCall, as
one of the grantees, argued that she was entitled to an interest in the
royalty on the Taub/Dwyer Tracts.2 9 Lila argued that "appurtenances
thereto" included Mildred's royalty interest in the Taub/Dwyer Tracts.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment, declaring that the Mc-
Call deeds did not vest Lila McCall with an interest in the Taub/Dwyer
22. Id. at 669.
23. Kilgore, 15 S.W.3d at 669.
24. 24 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
25. Id. at 509.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. McCall, 24 S.W.3d at 511.
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royalty interests.30
On appeal, Lila McCall contended Day & Co. v. Texiand Petroleum,
Inc.31 was controlling. Day & Co. is a leading Texas case on executive
rights, which held that previously severed executive rights passed to the
grantee under a general warranty deed, even though the executive rights
were not mentioned in the deed. The court held that the executive right,
although severed from the mineral estate, remained "an interest in prop-
erty, an incident and part of the mineral estate like the other attributes
such as bonus, royalty and delay rentals. ' '32 Because the executive rights
were not reserved or excepted, the executive rights were conveyed by the
deed. Lila McCall argued that Day & Co. was controlling because the
McCall deeds did not reserve or except the royalties on the Taub/Dwyer
Tracts.33
The court of appeals held that Day & Co. was distinguishable because
the royalty interests Lila McCall claimed were not "appurtenant" to the
mineral interests conveyed in the McCall deeds.34 The court cited with
approval the following definition of appurtenance from Balcar v. Lee
County Cotton Oil Co.:35
A thing belonging to another thing as principal, and which passes as
incident to the principal thing. A thing used with, and related to, or
dependent upon another thing more worthy, and agreeing in its na-
ture and quality with the thing whereunto it is appendant or appurte-
nant .... It is therefore limited to that which is necessary to the
enjoyment of the principal thing granted. An appurtenance is that
only which is incidental or indispensable to the proper use of the
premises demised. A mere conveyance does not create an
appurtenance. 36
The court held that nothing in the 1975 Partition or the McCall deeds
supported Lila McCall's position that the royalty interests under the ex-
isting leases on the Taub/Dwyer Tracts were appurtenant to the conveyed
McCall Tracts. 37
The case is significant for sharply limiting the meaning of "appurte-
nance" to that which is "incidental or indispensable to the premises de-
mised" (although incidental seems to leave an open door) and for the
court's refusal to extend the rational of Day & Co. to include royalty
interests within the same unitized tract but not expressly described as part
of the premises conveyed.
An adverse possessor must take actual possession of minerals under
the surface by drilling and producing them in order to successfully claim
30. Id.
31. 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
32. McCall, 24 S.W.3d at 514 (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d
667, 669 (Tex. 1990)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 193 S.W. 1094, 1095 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1917).
36. McCall, 24 S.W.3d at 514 n.8 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 514.
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title against the record owner of severed minerals. Sarandos v. Blanton38
holds that an erroneous vacancy award from the sovereign that purports
to convey both the surface and mineral estate does not alter this require-
ment. Blanton traced her title back to a mineral severance by deed and
reservation in 1963. 39 Sarandos eventually acquired the surface estate
and in 1975 applied to the General Land Office ("GLO") to purchase a
suspected vacancy located within the tract. 40 In 1977, the GLO awarded
the vacancy to Sarandos, and the purchase price was eventually fully paid
in 1996.41
Between 1975 and 1996 there were various leases and conveyances by
the parties, which reflected the parties' uncertainty as to the extent of
their title. At least some of these transactions would suggest that Blanton
acquiesced in the Sarandos claim to the alleged vacancy.42 However, a
resurvey in 1995 revealed that the vacancy was much smaller than the
Sarandos survey in 1975 had suggested, and the patent issued by the state
for the vacancy to Sarandos in 1996 excluded 60.652 acres previously
thought to be included in the vacancy.
This suit was filed to determine title to the 60.652 acres. It is well es-
tablished in Texas "that, after the mineral and surface estates have been
severed, an adverse possessor of the surface estate cannot accomplish ad-
verse possession of the mineral estate unless he takes actual possession of
the minerals under the surface by drilling and producing them for the
statutorily-prescribed period. '43
The undisputed evidence established that Sarandos never took actual
possession of the disputed minerals. 44 Sarandos argued that the drilling
and production requirement should not apply in this case because he ad-
versely possessed the disputed acreage under a vacancy award from the
sovereign which purported to convey both surface and mineral estates.
45
The court disagreed and relied heavily on Atlantic Refining Co. v.
Noel,46 which had a very similar fact pattern. To hold otherwise would
permit the surface owner unilaterally to divest the severed mineral owner
from his title based on nothing except the conduct of the surface owner,
over whom the mineral owner has no right of control.47
Siegert v. Seneca Resources Corp.48 considers whether a severed min-
eral estate is subject to the doctrine of accretion. A tract of land along
the Brazos River was described in a 1932 deed severing the minerals as
38. 25 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. filed).
39. Id. at 812.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 814.
42. Id. at 813-814.
43. Id. at 815 (citations omitted).
44. Sarandos, 25 S.W.3d at 818.
45. Id. at 816.
46. 443 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1969) (op. on reh'g).
47. Sarandos, 25 S.W.3d at 816, 817.
48. 28 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
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containing 100 acres. 49 A 1955 survey showed that the tract contained
181 acres. 50 Siegert contended that the increase was due to accretion and
that the doctrine of accretion is not applicable to severed minerals. 51
Under the doctrine of accretion, an owner of riparian land gains title to
increases in his property caused by natural forces. 52 Siegert claimed that
the 1932 deed could only have reserved a mineral interest to the original
100 acre tract that was described in the deed. 53 Following the Austin
Court of Appeals in Ely v. Briley,54 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
held that the doctrine of accretion applies to surface estates as well as
mineral estates and that a severed riparian mineral interest is subject to
accretion just as a surface estate is subject to accretion.55 To hold other-
wise would create claims to slivers or strips of small mineral interests
along river edges that would not appear in title searches and would be
virtually impossible to administer or litigate.56 The court also held that
there should be no difference between the mineral rights in unsevered
riparian mineral interests and severed riparian mineral interests.57
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. ROYALTY CLAUSE
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Roberts58 construes a provision of an oil
and gas lease which permits the lessor to terminate the lease for failure to
pay royalties. Payment of royalties under the lease was expressly gov-
erned by a clause in the lease which provided:
Royalties and other payments for production shall be due and owing
to Lessor within 120 days from the date of first production, and
thereafter such payments shall be due on or before the end of the
second calendar month following the month in which the production
for which the royalties or payments are to be made are sold and de-
livered. If Lessee wrongfully or unreasonably withholds any such
payment or payments due to Lessor for a period of thirty (30) days
after written demand for payment is made by Lessor on Lessee at the
above address (or other such address as made by specified in writing
hereafter by Lessee), at the election of Lessor this lease may be
terminated.59
Coastal drilled a gas well on November 19, 1997. On February 28,
1998, Coastal sent division orders to all interest owners with a letter that
stated that Coastal would pay royalties to the interest owners upon re-
49. Id. at 682.
50. Id. at 683.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 684.
53. Id.
54. 959 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
55. Siegert, 28 S.W.3d at 684.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 28 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h).
59. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
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ceipt of a completed division order. Several of the lessors ("Coates") did
not return a division order to Coastal. Under the terms of the lease, roy-
alties were due March 19, 1998, which was 120 days from the date of first
production. Coates sent a written demand for payment on March 24,
1998, stating that royalties were due and owing for the lease and that
Coastal had thirty days from receipt of the letter to pay all amounts due
and owing. Coastal responded in a letter dated April 21, 1998, stating
that Coates' demand for payment was insufficient and deliberately vague
because it did not explain the amounts owed or how Coastal had improp-
erly calculated royalties. On May 4, 1998, Coates notified Coastal that
Coates terminated the lease. 60 The trial court granted Coates' motion for
summary judgment and terminated the lease. 61 Coastal appealed. 62
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment. The court of appeals stated that termination of an oil and gas lease
could only occur if there was a breach of a special limitation or condition
subsequent. 63 Non-payment of royalties is usually considered a breach of
a covenant which will subject a party to liability for damages, but not
lease termination, unless the lease includes a clause which makes nonpay-
ment of royalties a breach of a special limitation or condition subse-
quent.64 The court of appeals ruled that the lease included an express
condition subsequent that the lessor could terminate the lease if Coates
could prove the following three elements:
Coastal failed to pay royalties on a timely basis;
Coates gave Coastal a written demand for payment; and
Coastal wrongfully or unreasonably withheld payment for thirty days
following the demand. 65
The evidence was undisputed that Coastal failed to pay royalties on a
timely basis. Coastal argued that the written demand was not adequate
because the demand letter failed to specify the particulars of any
breach.66 The court ruled that the lease only required "written demand
of payment" and that the demand letter complied with the terms of the
lease.67
The most interesting part of the case was the court's construction of the
operation and effect of the Texas division order statute in determining
whether Coastal "wrongfully or unreasonably" withheld payment. Be-
cause determining the meaning of "reasonably" could arguably present a
fact question not subject to resolution by summary judgment, the court
focused on the meaning of "wrongfully" and the Texas division order
statute.68
60. Id. at 762.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 761.




67. Id. at 764.
68. Coastal Oil, 28 S.W.3d at 765.
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Coastal argued that it had withheld payment of royalty pursuant to
Section 91.402(c)(1) of the Texas Natural Resources Code, which permits
a payor (lessee) to withhold payments of royalties to a lessor pending
receipt of a division order.69 Because Coastal was withholding payment
pursuant to a statute, Coastal argued that withholding payment from
Coates was not "wrongful or unreasonable," and because the lease ex-
pressly stated that royalty payments that were withheld pursuant to "any
law, order directive or regulation of any governmental or regulatory body
having jurisdiction" would not be considered "wrongful or
unreasonable. 70
Under Section 91.402(e) of the Texas Natural Resources Code, if a di-
vision order contains provisions in addition to any statutorily permitted
provisions, the lessee cannot withhold payment solely because the lessor
refuses to sign the division order.71 Coates asserted that it did not sign
the division order because it contained an unauthorized provision regard-
ing indemnification. 72 Section 91.402(c)(1) permits lessees to require
signed division orders from lessors, but only with certain standard provi-
sions. 73 One of the provisions a lessee may include is an agreement that
the lessor will indemnify the lessee for payments made to the lessor, if the
lessor does not have merchantable title to the production sold "unless
otherwise agreed." The lease was expressly made without warranty of
title.74 Therefore, Coates and Coastal had "otherwise agreed" not to in-
demnify Coastal with respect to title. The court of appeals ruled that
Coastal's division order did not comply with Section 91.402(c)(1); thus,
Coastal could not withhold payments based on that statute.75
Coastal also argued that it complied with Section 91.402(d) of the
Texas Natural Resources Code, which provides an alternative form for
division orders. However, the court of appeals stated that Sec-
tion 91.402(d) applied to division orders for "oil payments only," and be-
cause the producing well was a gas well, Section 91.402(d) was
inapplicable. 76 Coastal's division order for gas was required to comply
with Section 91.402(c)(1).
The court of appeals noted that Webster's New Twentieth Century Dic-
tionary defined wrongful as "full of wrong; unjust, unfair or injurious"
and "unlawful."'77 Because Coastal's withholding of royalty was not au-
thorized by Section 91.402(c)(1) of the Texas Natural Resources Code,
the withholding was unlawful; therefore, the withholding was wrongful.78






74. Coastal Oil, 28 S.W.3d at 766.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 767.
77. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 767.
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ting withholding of royalty if done under "law, order, directive or regula-
tion of any governmental or regulatory body having jurisdiction. 79
The holding that Texas Natural Resources Code § 91.402(d) is applica-
ble only to oil division orders is significant for both lessors and lessees. If
a lessor includes such a cancellation clause in his lease, the lessor cer-
tainly increases lessor's leverage over lessee to force timely payment of
royalties. Termination of a producing lease for failure to timely pay roy-
alty is draconian and fundamentally unfair but enforceable. Including a
provision that the lease is without warranty strips the lessee of any rea-
sonable opportunity to avoid the risk of wrongful payment because the
lessee will have to pay every possible claimant. Obviously, the lessee
should avoid leases with such clauses. Standard oil and gas leases already
may be canceled for failure to timely pay delay rentals and shut-in gas
payments and failure to produce in paying quantities. Agreeing to a pro-
vision canceling a lease for failure to timely pay royalties will only add
more obligations and problems for the lessee. When operating leases
contain similar lease cancellation provisions, the lessee should be careful
in suspending royalties for any reason. The consequence could be irre-
versible. It should be noted that in this case Coastal made no payment,
which leaves open the question of the effect of a partial payment or incor-
rect payment.
Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson80 refuses to accept the trial court's certifica-
tion of a class in a case involving ratable takes under the Common Pur-
chaser Act and Railroad Commission regulations from more than
900 wells. The trial court defined the plaintiff class as consisting of pro-
ducers of natural gas whose gas was taken by Intratex between 1978 and
1988 in less than ratable proportions. 81 The court found that class mem-
bers must be presently ascertainable by reference to objective criteria82
the definition cannot require a determination of the merits83 and that a
class definition which rests on the ultimate liability question cannot be
objective, nor can the class members be presently ascertained. 84 The
court refused to redefine the class on appeal and remanded to the trial
court.8 5
B. CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS AND SHUT-IN ROYALTY
Utley v. Marathon Oil Co.86 construes a continuous operations clause
and a shut-in royalty clause in a lease termination case. Marathon com-
menced the drilling of a well late in the primary term and completed drill-
79. Id. at 767.
80. 22 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. 2000).
81. Id. at 400.
82. Id. at 403.
83. Id. at 404.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 408.
86. 31 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet. h.).
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ing operations after the expiration of the primary term.87 For a period in
excess of ninety days, Marathon attempted to test and complete in the
Cotton Valley Lime. After expending $440,000 on testing and comple-
tion, Marathon gave up and plugged back and completed in the Bossier
Sand.88 Utley contended that Marathon's attempts to complete in the
Cotton Valley Lime were not in good faith or did not qualify as "continu-
ous operations. ''89 The continuous operations clause was a common form
clause providing that if Marathon was:
engaged in operations for drilling, mining or reworking any well or
mine thereon, this lease shall remain in force so long as such opera-
tions or said additional operations are commenced and prosecuted
(whether on the same or successive wells) with no cessation of more
than ninety (90) consecutive days .... 90
The trial court instructed the jury: "that operations means actual work
being done in a good faith endeavor to cause a well to produce oil and/or
gas in paying quantities. ' 91
There was no objection or attempt to limit what evidence the jury
could consider. There was a single broad form submission of the question
to the jury, which asked whether operations on the well ceased for any
period longer than ninety consecutive days during the time interval chal-
lenged by Utley. 92 The jury answered in Marathon's favor and judgment
was entered that the lease had not terminated. 93
The court described the trial as a "classic case of competing experts. '94
There was a great deal of evidence from both sides as to whether the
completion attempts in the Cotton Valley Lime were prudent or in good
faith, but the jury ultimately believed Marathon, and the court refused to
disturb that finding.95 The court apparently found little Texas authority
defining "operations" in the context of a continuous operations clause.
After noting the definitions accepted in other cases considering "rework-
ing operations," and in the absence of any objection by Utley, the court
simply accepted the trial court's instruction as defining the conduct which
the jury could consider.96
In addition to the completion efforts in the Cotton Valley Lime, Mara-
thon had also been engaged in completing a pipeline to connect to the
well.97 Utley contended on appeal that pipeline construction is not "op-
erations" that will extend the lease. 98 However, Utley did not object to
87. Id. at 275-276.
88. Id. at 277.
89. Id. at 276.
90. Id. at 275.
91. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
92. Utley, 31 S.W.3d at 276.
93. Id. at 275.
94. Id. at 279.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 276.
98. Utley, 31 S.W.3d at 277.
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the charge for failure to include a limiting instruction and did not request
such an instruction. Thus, it was not possible to determine what activity
(completion attempt or pipeline construction) the jury considered as op-
erations.99 Because the court found sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding based on the completion attempt, it never reached the pipe-
line construction issue.100
There was also an unrelated claim in the same case for lease termina-
tion based on a failure to pay shut-in royalties. Acreage from the lease
was included in multiple pooled units. Utley contended that there was no
proportionate reduction clause applicable to shut-in royalties, and that
the entire shut-in royalty, as expressed in dollars, must be paid as to each
portion of the leased premises included in a unit, or, in other words, for
each pooled unit. 101 Apparently Marathon had made shut-in payments
after making various proportionate reductions. There was no "Freestone
Rider" clause in the lease providing that a well on pooled acreage would
hold only pooled unit acreage.102 The opinion does not state all the facts
because the court found that the proper payment of shut-in royalty was
not a prerequisite to a judgment in this case preserving the lease. Be-
cause there was another well on the lease commenced and completed in
the middle of the ninety-day window challenged by Utley, the court
found that the lease was preserved by the continuous operations clause,
regardless of the payment or attempted payment of shut-in royalty.103
The case is significant for providing some guidance on the definition of
"operations" as used in a continuous operations clause. The definition
includes the concepts of "actual work" in a "good faith" effort to cause a
well "to produce" in "paying quantities." Although other cases defining
"reworking operations"10 4 have included as an additional element that
the work be the same as that which an "ordinarily competent operator"
would undertake, that element is not included in the instruction accepted
by the court in Utley. However, there was no objection to the omission of
that element.
IV. OPERATING, EXPLORATION AND
FARMOUT AGREEMENTS
Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Homburg'0 5 construes the provisions of a
joint operating agreement ("JOA") regarding selection of successor oper-
ators, authorization for expenditure ("AFE") letters, and the application
99. Id. at 278.
100. Id. at 279.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 280.
103. Id. at 281.
104. See Cox v. Stowers, 786 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ). See
also Rogers v. Osborn, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311, 313-314 (1953) and Hydrocarbon
Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 438 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993, no writ).
105. 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso, no pet. h.).
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of the exculpatory clause to the operator. Abraxas purchased the lease-
hold interest of the operator of a prolific oil lease in September 1992.
Abraxas assumed responsibilities as operator, although there was no for-
mal election of a successor operator as provided in the JOA. There was
an immediate and significant decline in production. In November 1993,
Abraxas notified the non-operators that all production had ceased from
the four producing wells located on the lease and included an AFE which
described the proposed workover procedures to restore the wells to pro-
duction and the cost estimate for each well. The estimated costs to
workover all four wells totaled $44,250.00, but no one well was estimated
to require more than $30,000.00 (the amount requiring an AFE under the
JOA). To participate in the proposed workover procedures, the AFE let-
ter required the non-operators to pay their proportionate share of the
expenses. If the non-operators declined, Abraxas, as operator, would in-
voke the 300% non-consent penalty under the JOA.10 6
None of the non-operators elected to proceed with the workover oper-
ations. Abraxas deemed the status of the non-operators to be "non-con-
sent" under the JOA as of December 1, 1993. Although the AFE letter
had listed workover procedures totaling $44,250.00 for all four wells,
Abraxas actually performed only one small project in December 1993 at a
cost of approximately $7,500.00. Abraxas did not notify any of the non-
operators that it had decided not to complete all the proposed operations.
Because of further problems with the wells on the lease, Abraxas decided
to shut down the lease and to produce only one barrel from one well per
day each month in order to hold the lease. Consequently, the lease was
reduced from a 1,000 barrel-per-month producer when Abraxas obtained
the lease, to a lease producing only 30 barrels or less of oil per month.10 7
The non-operators filed suit against Abraxas alleging, among other
things, negligence, gross negligence, willful misconduct, breach of con-
tract and waste. 10 8 The trial court determined that Abraxas had never
been formally selected as operator pursuant to the provisions of the JOA.
The jury found that Abraxas (1) was grossly negligent in committing
waste, (2) breached the JOA by sending the AFE, and (3) engaged in
willful misconduct or gross negligence in failing to perform the work pro-
posed under the AFE. 10 9 The verdict and judgment included substantial
exemplary damages in addition to actual damages and no offset was al-
lowed for reasonable and necessary expenditures on the lease." 0 The El
Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, except as
to the award of exemplary damages, which it deleted."'
The court first addressed the trial court's determination that Abraxas
had never been formally selected as operator under the JOA. The court
106. Id. at 747.
107. Id. at 748.
108. Id.
109. Abraxas, 29 S.W.3d at 749.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 746.
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ruled that the non-operators waived the JOA requirement that Abraxas
be formally selected as operator of the Lease. The court based its holding
on its prior decision in Purvis Oil Corp. v. Hillin,"a2 in which it held that
non-operating working interest owners could waive requirements of the
JOA pertaining to selection of a successor operator by permitting another
party to act as operator and by accepting the benefits of that party's per-
formance. The facts in Purvis were distinguishable because in that case
the operator was actually selected, but at the time of selection, it owned
no interest in the Contract Area. In Abraxas, the operator was never
formally selected. The court found the distinction to be immaterial. 113
The jury finding that Abraxas committed "waste" was the only tort
claim supporting the award of approximately $725,000 in exemplary dam-
ages. 114 The court noted that waste includes injury resulting from a fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care in the preservation of property. However,
in this case, the JOA governed the conduct of the operator with respect
to production of oil from the land. The JOA gave Abraxas the contrac-
tual right to produce oil from the Lease, and although no provision spe-
cifically prohibited Abraxas from committing waste, Article V.A. of the
JOA required that the operator "conduct all such operations in a good
and workmanlike manner." 1 5 In other words, the duty violated was in
contract rather than in tort, the non-operators were not permitted to
maintain a common law tort cause of action for waste, and therefore the
non-operators could not recover exemplary damages.116
The court ruled that releasing an unjustified AFE could constitute a
breach of the JOA:
Abraxas is correct that an AFE is an estimate or budget of proposed
expenses, but that is not its sole or even its primary function. The
sending of an AFE triggers the consent/non-consent provisions of
the JOA and puts the receiving parties to an election of participating
in the proposal or suffering a substantial penalty in the event the
proposed work results in a producing well. Therefore, if an AFE is
unjustified under the facts, then it may constitute a breach of the
JOA to send the AFE and put the parties to that election. 1' 7
The court found that the expert testimony offered by the non-operators
constituted sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that sending
the AFE letter breached the JOA. 1 8 The expert testified that the
projects proposed by Abraxas in the AFE letter were not subject to Arti-
cle VI because none of them involved a reworking, deepening, or plug-
ging back of the four wells on the lease. The proposed work concerned
routine, normal repairs to the wells which Abraxas had an obligation as
112. 890 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, no writ).
113. Abraxas, 20 S.W.3d at 751.
114. Id. at 753.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 755.
118. Id. at 758.
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operator to undertake without sending the AFE. In fact, only a few
months before Abraxas sent the AFE letter to the non-operators,
Abraxas had done identical work on the wells and had billed the non-
operators for their respective shares of the expenses through joint inter-
est billings. 119 The expert testimony also supported the finding of breach
of contract because no single project exceeded $30,000 as required by
Article VI. D.3.120 The court never reached the question of whether the
failure to perform all the work described in the AFE was a breach of
contract.121
Abraxas contended that sending the AFE letter did not cause any dam-
ages to the non-operators. The court noted that sending the AFE letter
triggered the contractual obligation of the non-operators to elect whether
to participate in the cost of the proposed operations or suffer the 300%
penalty specified in the JOA. Abraxas seized the interest of the non-
operators and began appropriating their earnings. Abraxas continued to
withhold the earnings even though it did not complete the operations
specified in the AFE letter. Abraxas retained the interest of the non-
operators until the lease had no more value. The court ruled that the
evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to establish that sending
the AFE letter caused damages to the non-operators. 122 There was also a
dispute as to the proper measure of damages. Abraxas contended that
the issue as submitted to the jury measured damages by diminution in
value rather than lost profits. 123 The court concluded that the expert tes-
timony, although expressed in terms of "market value," was based on
calculating the reduction in the future income stream, which was the ex-
pectation interest.124
Abraxas next asserted that the jury's failure to make a finding of gross
negligence or willful misconduct in connection with its sending of the
AFE letter precluded a finding of liability for breach of contract.
Abraxas relied on Article V.A. of the JOA which contained the following
exculpatory clause:
[Operator] . . . shall conduct and direct and have full control of all
operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by, and
within the limits of, this agreement. It shall conduct all such opera-
tions in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liabil-
ity as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities
incurred except such as may result from gross negligence or willful
misconduct.125
The court noted that exculpatory clauses in a contract are utilized gen-
erally to exempt one party from future liability for negligence, and the
119. Id. at 756-57.
120. Abraxas, 20 S.W.3d at 757.
121. Id. at 761.
122. Id. at 758.
123. Id. at 759.
124. Id. at 759-60.
125. Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
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court found no cases discussing exculpatory clauses exempting a party
from liability for breach of contract. The court concluded that the excul-
patory clause was limited to claims based upon an allegation that Abraxas
had failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and did not apply to a
claim that it breached the JOA. Because the exculpatory clause did not
apply to a breach of contract, and the non-operators were not entitled to
exemplary damages for breach of contract, the non-operators were not
obligated to prove gross negligence or willful misconduct. 126
The industry is sometimes loose in appointing successor operators
when there is a transfer of the majority interest, and it is obvious who will
be named as successor operator. This case follows existing case law in
finding that the formalities of selecting a successor may be waived. The
case is more significant for its finding that sending an AFE may be a
breach of contract and for so readily finding causation and damages. Al-
though not addressed in this opinion, it appears to be a foregone conclu-
sion that this court would also find that failing to perform the work
outlined in the AFE would also be a breach of contract.
Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.127 construes the removal-of-op-
erator provisions of a Unitization Agreement and an Operating Agree-
ment. The Unitization Agreement combined various oil and gas
properties, and the Operating Agreement described how the unitized
properties would be operated. Cross Timbers and Exxon were successors
in interest to some of the working interest owners, and Exxon was the
operator under the Operating Agreement.' 28
Cross Timbers asserted that two specific provisions, one from the Op-
erating Agreement and one from the Unit Agreement, permitted the
working interest owners to remove Exxon as operator by a vote of the
working interest owners. The first provision, found in the Operating
Agreement, stated:
3.1 Overall Supervision. Working Interest Owners shall exercise
overall supervision and control of all matters pertaining to Unit Op-
erations pursuant to this agreement and the Unit Agreement .... 129
The second provision, found in the Unit Agreement, stated:
4.3 Change of Operating Methods. Nothing herein shall prevent
Working Interest Owners from discontinuing or changing in whole or
in part any method of operation which, in their opinion, is no longer
in accord with good engineering or production practices. Other
methods of operation may be conducted or changes may be made by
Working Interest Owners from time to time if determined by them to
be feasible, necessary, or desirable to increase the ultimate recovery
of Unitized Substances. 130
126. Abraxas, 20 S.W.3d at 759.
127. 22 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet. h.)
128. Id. at 25-26.
129. Id. at 27.
130. Id. at 27.
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Cross Timbers argued that the effect of these two provisions was to
grant the working interest owners authority to remove the operator as
part of their power to "supervise and control . ..operations" and to
change the "method of operation.' 131 Cross Timbers persuaded 65% or
more of the working interest owners to join it in voting to remove Exxon
as operator.132
Exxon refused to step down. Exxon relied on Section 7.1 of the Oper-
ating Agreement, which stated that "subject to the provisions of this
agreement and to instructions from Working Interest Owners, Unit Oper-
ator shall have the exclusive right and be obligated to conduct Unit Oper-
ations," and on Section 4.1 of the Unit Agreement, which stated that
"Unit Operator shall have the exclusive right to conduct Unit
Operations."'133
Cross Timbers then sued Exxon for breach of contract, contending that
Exxon had violated the agreement by failing to step down as operator. 134
Neither party contended that the agreements were ambiguous. 35 Both
Cross Timbers and Exxon moved for summary judgment and the trial
court granted Exxon's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Cross
Timbers's Motion for Summary Judgment.1 36 The court of appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that Section 3.1 of the
Operating Agreement and Section 4.3 of the Unit Agreement did not
grant the removal power to the working interest owners when construed
in conjunction with the other sections of the two agreements. 37
Article 3.2 of the Operating Agreement contained a non-exclusive list
of powers extended to the working interest owners, including "the au-
thority to determine the method of operation; the wells to be drilled;
recompleted, abandoned, or changed; the amount of expenditures in ex-
cess of $25,000 which can be made; and, the ultimate disposition of unit
equipment.' 38 Section 4.3 of the Unit Agreement also uses the phrase
"method of operation." Neither agreement defined "operations" or
"method of operation." However, the Amarillo Court of Appeals had
earlier defined "operations" to mean the "overall process aimed at
achieving a particular end" in Sun Operating Ltd. v. Holt.139 Thus,
"method of operation" as used in this Operating Agreement and Unit
Agreement refers to how the unitized tract would be developed and how
the minerals would be produced. The court of appeals ruled that the
working interest owners were given the power to determine what can be
done, where it can be done, and when it can be done.140
131. Id.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Id. at 28.
134. Cross Timbers Oil Co., 22 S.W.3d at 26.
135. Id. at 27, n.3.
136. Id. at 26.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
139. 984 S.W.2d 277, 285 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
140. Cross Timbers Oil Co., 22 S.W.3d at 27-28.
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There was no express reference among the powers extended to the
working interest owners, however, as to who would carry out the devel-
opment and production of the minerals. Section 7.1 of the Operating
Agreement and Section 4.1 of the Unit Agreement specifically vested the
right to conduct the operations in Exxon to the exclusion of everyone
else. The court of appeals ruled that the Operating Agreement and Unit
Agreement provided that the working interest owners could determine
production and development of the minerals while the operator fulfilled
their directives. Although the working interest owners could not remove
the operator, they could determine what the operator would do, how the
operator would do it, and when the operator would do it.141
The model form operating agreements published by the American As-
sociation of Petroleum Landmen are the forms most commonly used by
the industry. These printed forms have express provisions governing the
removal of operator. The significance of this case is the holding that con-
trol over operations does not necessarily include control over who will
operate. If there is no express removal-of-operator provision, or if the
provision has been deleted, then perhaps there will be no removal of
operator.
Energen Resources MAQ, Inc. v. Dalbosco1 42 is an interesting case that
relies upon custom and usage in the oil and gas industry to impose liabil-
ity on an operator who abandons a well without notice to the non-opera-
tors. Dalbosco farmed out leases to Energen's predecessor; Energen
drilled a producing well; and Dalbosco backed into a working interest at
payout. No written operating agreement was ever executed. When the
well stopped producing, Energen plugged and abandoned without notice
to Dalbosco. 143
Summary judgment for Energen in the first trial was affirmed on all
claims, except as to whether there was a contractual duty based on cus-
tom and usage in the oil and gas industry, which was remanded to the
trial court as an issue of fact. 144 At the second trial, Dalbosco was suc-
cessful in obtaining favorable jury findings as to the existence of the duty
to give notice based on custom and usage, and he recovered actual dam-
ages and attorney's fees.145 The jury issue presented at the second trial
read as follows: "Did the custom and usage in the oil and gas industry in
1981 impose a contractual duty on Defendant to provide notice to Don
Dalbosco of its intent to abandon and plug the McDuffie No. 1 well
before the expiration of the McDuffie lease?" 146
141. Id.
142. 23 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. filed)
143. Id. at 553.
144. Dalbosco v. Energen Resources MAQ, Inc., No. 01-92-00898-CV 1994 Tex. App.
LEXIS 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 1994, no writ) (not designated for
publication).
145. Dalbosco, 23 S.W.2d at 552-53.
146. Id. at 554.
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The court relied heavily upon the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Bar-
reda v. Milmo Nat'l Bank, which held that "the general rule regarding
custom and usage, in the case of contract, is that the custom and usage
must be so general that both parties are presumed to be aware of the
custom or usage, or that the parties have actual knowledge of the custom
or usage, and the parties are charged with having contracted with refer-
ence to the custom or usage.' 47
There were at least three witnesses who presented some evidence
which tended to support Dalbosco's position as to the custom and usage
in the industry. The witnesses included Energen's former attorney who
testified that form operating agreements entered into over the years by
Energen had notice provisions triggered by the plugging and abandon-
ment of a well.148 On appeal, there was a "no evidence" point, but there
was no issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 149 The court did
not have any difficulty in finding some evidence of custom and usage, and
therefore it overruled the "no evidence" point.1S°
Energen sought to avoid the effect of the jury's finding by contending
that there was no express jury finding that Energen knew of the existence
of the custom or that Energen contracted with reference to that custom.
The court found that it was not Dalbosco's burden to prove that Energen
knew of the custom or contracted with reference to it, but rather it was
Energen's burden to rebut the presumption that the parties specifically
contracted with reference to the custom.151
Energen also raised as a defense the exculpatory clause in its farmout
agreement, which provided:
A. Compliance with Laws and Lease Obligations: Farmee agrees to
use its best efforts to observe, perform and comply with all of the
conditions and covenants, expressed and implied, of the oil and gas
leases, and instruments to which such leases are subject, covering the
drillsite of any well, and all laws, rules, regulations and orders, both
State and Federal, relating to the ownership and enjoyment and the
development and operations of the acreage covered by such leases,
and Farmee will use its best efforts to maintain all rights in the acre-
age, but Farmee shall incur no liability to Farmor as a result of its
failure to maintain the interest of both Farmor and Farmee hereunder,
all or any of their rights in said acreage, or any part thereof.'52
The court rejected this defense and held that Dalbosco was not suing
"for loss of any rights in the acreage," but "for breach of a contractual
duty to give notice imposed by custom and usage."'1 53 There is no further
explanation of the court's reasoning, but presumably the greater part of
Dalbosco's damages would be measured "by the loss of any rights in the
147. Id. at 556 (citing Barreda v. Mimo Nat'l Bank, 252 S.W. 1038,1039-40 (Tex. 1923)).
148. Id. at 555-56.
149. Id. at 554.
150. Id. at 556-57.
151. Dalbosco, 23 S.W.2d at 567, n.1.




acreage." The damages for failure to give notice, other than the damages
for "the loss of rights in the acreage," would probably be negligible. Per-
haps the court was referring to the salvage value of the personal property
associated with the well, but the salvage value of a typical well would not
equal 10% of the damages awarded in this case.
The value of the case as a precedent is further reduced by the fact that
there was some evidence that Dalbosco and Energen's landman actually
discussed and reached an express agreement on Dalbosco's right to take
over the well. Thus, the holding is limited by the court's opinion that:
The presumption that the parties dealt with reference to the custom
was not rebutted. To the contrary, a reasonable inference could be
drawn from the "handshake deal" between Dalbosco and a represen-
tative of Energen's predecessor that the parties specifically con-
tracted with reference to the custom. 5 4
The case is unusual because there was no written operating agreement,
there was no challenge to the qualifications of Dalbosco's experts or to
the factual sufficiency of their opinions, and there may have been an ex-
press agreement on the right to take over operations. Nevertheless, the
case is now some authority that the operator who plugs and abandons a
well without notice to the non-operators is assuming a significant risk,
unless there is some very clear contractual agreement that the operator is
under no duty to give notice or to permit a non-operator to take over the
well.
North Central Oil Corp. v. The Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.,155
construes an area of mutual interest agreement within a farmout agree-
ment. North Central Oil Corporation ("North Central") and The Louisi-
ana Land and Exploration Company ("LL&E") each claimed under
almost identical farmout agreements. LL&E acquired another farmee's
interest in existing leases. North Central sued LL&E, asserting that
LL&E was required to offer a proportionate share of its newly acquired
interests to North Central.15 6
The farmout agreements contained the following provision:
In the event that either party acquires an interest in oil and gas leases
within the area delineated by the solid heavy line on the map at-
tached hereto as Exhibit "F," it shall promptly offer an interest
therein by notice in writing, describing the terms and conditions ap-
plicable to such acquisition, to the other party and any third parties
owning interests in the Exhibit "A" and "B" leases in proportion to
the ownership of each such party in said leases. Such interests shall
be offered on the basis of actual costs of acquisition. Any offeree
hereunder shall have ten (10) days in which to elect by written notice
to offeror to participate in such acquisition. Failure to respond
within said period shall be deemed an election not to participate.
Each party electing to participate shall have the right to acquire an
154. Id. at 556.
155. 22 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. filed).
156. Id. at 574-75.
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interest in the proportion that its interest assigned hereunder bears
to the interest of all electing parties and shall tender its proportion-
ate share of the acquisition cost within fifteen (15) days after receipt
of a formal assignment of such interest. Wolf Exploration Company
shall, as to such leases, be entitled to the same overriding royalty,
provided for hereinabove in paragraphs 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.157
LL&E contended that this provision applied only to after-acquired
leases and not existing leases. 158 North Central contended that this provi-
sion gave North Central the right to purchase a share of any interest in
leases acquired by LL&E in the area.159
Although neither party had asserted that the farmout agreements were
ambiguous, the court concluded that the farmouts were ambiguous and
remanded because the farmout agreements were capable of two mean-
ings that were directly opposed but equally credible. 160
Rodessa Resources, Inc. v. Arcadia Exploration and Production Co.161
considers when limitations will begin to run in cases involving fraud and
fraudulent concealment. Arcadia was the operator of a well in which The
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company ("LL&E") held an overriding
royalty interest with a contractual option to convert the overriding roy-
alty to a working interest within sixty days after being notified that pay-
out had occurred. 162 Arcadia was contractually obligated to provide
information in monthly statements to LL&E that would reflect the cur-
rent status of payout on the well.
Arcadia stopped sending the statements showing the payout balance in
1986, and it wrote to LL&E that Arcadia believed LL&E had no right to
convert its override in the well.163 Within the next year, the well was
recompleted, production increased 2000%, and payout of the well oc-
curred in 1987.164 On March 17, 1989, two years after payout, LL&E
wrote Arcadia pointing out that Arcadia had not provided the requisite
information about the status of payout on the well. Arcadia did not re-
spond to the letter or to telephone calls. On May 10, 1994, five years
after payout, LL&E wrote Arcadia again, and again received no re-
sponse. In June 1995, LL&E prepared its own payout statement from the
revenue information provided with the royalty checks, the operating ex-
penses reflected in the statements LL&E received until 1986, and the re-
completion costs obtained by LL&E from other working interest
owners.165 LL&E's own calculations were within one month of the cor-
157. Id. at 576.
158. Id. at 577.
159. Id. at 578; cf. Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d
197 (1957).
160. North Central, 22 S.W.3d at 581.
161. 5 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet. h.).
162. Id. at 365.
163. Id. at 368.
164. Id. at 365, 368.
165. Id. at 368.
20011 1541
SMU LAW REVIEW
rect payout date. 166 LL&E and its successor sued Arcadia for breach of
contract and fraud in 1995, six years after payout.167
The jury found Arcadia breached its contract and committed fraud, and
it awarded substantial damages. However, the jury also found that
LL&E, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered
Arcadia failed to provide written notice of payout on March 17, 1989, the
first date LL&E sent a letter to Arcadia requesting payout information
on the well. 168 As a result of the jury finding, the trial court concluded
the entire action was barred by limitations and rendered a take nothing
judgment in favor of Arcadia.
A person must bring suit on a cause of action for breach of contract or
fraud no later than four years after the day the claim accrues.169 A cause
of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury even if the
fact of injury is not discovered until later and even if all resulting damages
have not yet occurred. 170 In some cases, the discovery rule may defer the
accrual of the cause of action if the cause of action is inherently undiscov-
erable and the damages are objectively verifiable. 171 Unlike the discov-
ery rule, which applies only if the wrongful act is inherently
undiscoverable and the damages are objectively verifiable, the running of
the statute of limitations in cases involving fraud and fraudulent conceal-
ment is tolled until the fraud is discovered or should have been discov-
ered through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 172
A more precise issue would have inquired as to the date upon which
LL&E "in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that
Arcadia was concealing the cause of action by failing to provide written
notice of the payout." 173 The issue as submitted was not precise, but it
was adequate. The court of appeals held that there was sufficient evi-
dence to support the jury finding that LL&E should have discovered de-
fendant's failure to provide notice of payout in 1989, when LL&E first
wrote a letter requesting operating statements to Arcadia. Further, the
evidence showed that LL&E could have determined payout occurred
much earlier based the information provided to LL&E from Arcadia and
other working interest owners. 174 Even though LL&E should have dis-
covered Arcadia's fraudulent concealment in 1989, suit was not filed until
1995, more than four years from the date LL&E should have known of
the fraudulent concealment. Thus, limitations barred all claims. This
case is significant for pointing out the distinctions between the applica-
tion of the discovery rule and the deferral of the commencement of the
166. Id.
167. Rodessa Resources, 5 S.W.3d at 365.
168. Id.
169. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004, 16.051 (Vernon 1997).
170. Rodessa Resources, 5 S.W.3d at 366.
171. Id. at 365 (citing S. V. v. R. V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)).
172. Id. at 365, 366.
173. Id. at 367.
174. Id. at 368.
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running of limitations in cases involving fraud and fraudulent conceal-
ment. The discovery rule and the application of statutes of limitation
continue to be hot topics in oil and gas cases because relationships tend to
be long term, the issues are often complex, and the damages can often be
significant.
Advent Trust Co. v. Hyder175 is a discovery rule case. If applicable, the
discovery rule tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff actually discovered, or should have discovered in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the facts giving rise to the cause of action. In this
case, the operator produced two wells as dual completions, commingling
production, and failing to file the necessary forms with the Railroad
Commission.176 The working interest owners then farmed out one of the
produced zones to CPX. After drilling a dry hole, CPX discovered the
prior production, sued all the working interest owners, and obtained a
substantial recovery. 177 The Railroad Commission also assessed an ad-
ministrative fine against the operator. 178 More than four years after the
CPX petition was served, the non-operator working interest owners sued
the operator alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud,
breach of contract, and common-law indemnity.179 The causes of action
accrued when the CPX petition was served. 180 The critical issue was
whether the limitation period commenced when the non-operators were
served with the CPX petition. The operator argued that all claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. The non-operators contended that
the discovery rule, fraudulent concealment, and equitable estoppel ap-
plied. 181 The court of appeals concluded that all claims were time-barred
and reversed and rendered judgment that the non-operators take
nothing.' 82
At the time the CPX petition was served, the operator told the non-
operators that the filings were complete, which was the basis for the non-
operators contentions of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel.
The court held that the non-operators not only failed to properly submit
the issues of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel but also
failed to establish the necessary element of reasonable reliance. 183 When
the non-operators were served with CPX's petition, they could have
searched the Railroad Commission files themselves, and at least one of
them did. The non-operators could not thereafter rely upon the opera-
tor's representations that the filings were complete when the records
were publicly available. 184
175. 12 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
176. Id. at 537.
177. Id. at 537-38.
178. Id. at 538.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 540-41.
181. Advent Trust Co., 12 S.W.3d at 538.
182. Id. at 544.
183. Id. at 543.
184. Id. at 542.
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The more interesting part of the case is the court's discussion of the
application of the discovery rule, and the court's almost petulant request
for more guidance from the Texas Supreme Court. The supreme court's
opinion in the recent case of HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel185 upheld a
limitations defense in a suit brought by royalty owners against their
lessee. The lessee discovered reservoir damage caused by an adjoining
operator, sued and recovered, but never informed the royalty owners. By
the time the royalty owners actually discovered the reservoir damage, it
was too late for them to sue anyone. HECI held that the discovery rule
did not apply because damage to a reservoir from illegal production is not
the type of injury that is inherently undiscoverable. 186
The difficult issue for the San Antonio Court was divining the meaning
of HECI, which stated that in certain circumstances some records of the
Railroad Commission may provide constructive notice. 187 In considering
the meaning of HECI, the San Antonio Court said:
We admit to being somewhat bewildered by this language.... How
are royalty owners.... who are not knowledgeable about the state of
the Railroad Commission records, able to distinguish between pro-
duction records that provide constructive notice and those that do
not? Rather than bringing predictability and consistency to this area
of the law, we fear that placing the onus on royalty owners to hire
the experts necessary to investigate whether the Railroad Commis-
sion records reveal they are being cheated is inherently unfair and
unworkable in the oil and gas business environment we have come to
know. 188
The San Antonio Court found that HECI was not controlling because a
dual completion was not apparent from an inspection of the surface, nor
were there any records on file with the Railroad Commission that would
reveal the dual completion. 189 The opinion is clearly dicta on this point
and entirely unnecessary to the holding.190 It was unnecessary because
the service of the CPX petition was all the notice that was required.
However, the opinion indicates how closely a court may look at the facts
of each case under the general guidelines set forth in HECI and the con-
fusion that remains after HECI as to whether Railroad Commission
records are or are not constructive notice that will defeat a claim that the
discovery rule should apply.
V. DRILLING CONTRACTS
Ken Petroleum Corp. v. Questor Drilling Corp. 191 construes the Texas
185. 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
186. Id. at 886.
187. Advent Trust Co., 12 S.W.3d at 539, n.1.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 539-40.
190. Id.
191. 24 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. 2000).
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Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act ("Act"). 192 The Act requires parties to mu-
tual indemnity agreements to agree in writing to procure insurance or
self-insurance to support the mutual indemnity obligations. The agree-
ment does not have to specify the amount of insurance to be provided,
and the agreement is not void if the parties obtain differing amounts of
insurance.193 The indemnities are void as to both parties for amounts
greater than the lesser amount of insurance provided. 194
The court based its opinion upon an analysis of legislative history and
determined that the legislature's intent was to prevent overreaching by
one party against another. There was no intent that insurance policies
must match, nor did the legislature intend that the parties must adjust
their insurance policy with every drilling contract.195 The statute requires
a writing to memorialize only that "each party as indemnitor has agreed
to provide" insurance or self-insurance to support the indemnity
obligations. 196
VI. GAS CONTRACTS
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc.197 is a take-or-pay
case that turns on the good faith obligations imposed by the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC"). 198 During the bust of the mid-1980s, El
Paso, as purchaser, and Minco, as seller, entered into a series of settle-
ment and termination agreements that not only terminated the take-or-
pay contracts but also contained a waiver or release as to El Paso for all
past liabilities. 199 To avoid the waiver or release, Minco asserted that the
agreements were procured in violation of the UCC and a breach of the
duty of good faith contained in the UCC.20°
Absent a special relationship between the parties, there is in Texas no
common law duty to act in good faith.20 1 However, the buying and sell-
ing of oil and gas is a sale of goods covered by the UCC.20 2 There is a
statutory duty of good faith imposed by the UCC, and whether El Paso
had a statutory duty to act in good faith under the UCC was a question of
law which the Texas Supreme Court reviewed de novo.20 3 The UCC
clearly imposes a duty of good faith in the performance and amendment
of contracts, but the issue in this case was whether the duty of good faith
extends to the formation of a contract and, as a necessary corollary,
192. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.001-.007 (Vernon 1997).
193. Ken Petroleum, 24 S.W.3d at 346.
194. Id. at 350.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 351.
197. 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 1999).
198. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.203, 2.209 (Vernon 1994).
199. El Paso, 8 S.W.3d at 311.
200. Id. at 312.
201. Id. at 313.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 312.
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whether a release is a new contract or a modification of an existing
contract.
Section 1.203 states that "[e]very contract or duty within this title im-
poses an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. 2 0 4
Section 2.103 defines "good faith" in the case of a merchant as "honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade. ' 20 5 Section 1.201(19) defines "good faith" as hon-
esty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 20 6 However, the su-
preme court held that this duty of good faith does not extend to the
formation of a contract and a release is a contract.20 7 Section 1.203 im-
poses no good faith duty on El Paso because it applies to the performance
and the enforcement of an existing contract and not to forming or procur-
ing a contract, including a mutual release of liability.20 8
Section 2.209(a) states that "[a]n agreement modifying a contract
within this chapter needs no consideration to be binding. °20 9 Comment 2
to that section states that modifications made under Section 2.209(a):
"[m]ust meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act. The effective use
of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract is barred, and
the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is
ineffective as a violation of good faith." 210
The supreme court rejected the application of UCC § 2.209 because
"[a] release of liability is not an agreement to modify a contract but is an
agreement to completely relinquish the parties' performance obligations
to each other. ' 21 Because the breach of duty of good faith was the only
remaining basis for the judgment, the supreme court reversed and ren-
dered judgment that the releases would be enforced. 212
204. Id. at 313 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Vernon 1994).
205. El Paso, 8 S.W.3d at 313 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.103 (Vernon
1994)).
206. Id. at n.12 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(19) (Vernon 1994)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 314.
209. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.209(a) (Vernon 1994).
210. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.209 cmt. 2 (Vernon 1994).
211. El Paso, 8. S.W.3d at 314.
212. Id. at 316.
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